offering short end-to-end delays and low packet loss ratios.
called RITA, evaluates the trust among vehicles for independent time periods, while the risk estimation computes the behavior variation between smaller, consecutive time periods in order to prevent risks like an intelligent attacker attempting to bypass the security measures deployed. In addition, our proposal works over a collaborative multi-hop broadcast communication technique for both Vehicle-To-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-To-Roadside unit (V2R) messages in order to ensure an efficient dissemination of both safety and infotainment messages. Simulation results evidence the high efficiency of RITA at enhancing the detection ratios by more than 7% compared to existing solutions, such as T-CLAIDS and AECFV, even in the presence of high ratios of attackers, while
Introduction
Securing communications in distributed and collaborative networks is always a challenging task, and it is even becoming mandatory in most cases. Usually it requires adopting case-specific and situation-adaptable communication protocols addressing the different security issues. In wireless environments, achieving 5 an adequate security level is more challenging than in wired environments due to the open communication medium. In addition, the assumption that all peers are honest, trustful, and collaborative is not always true.
Many efficient security solutions have been proposed to secure wireless and collaborative communications, most of them being based on a centralized ad- In this scenario, RoadSide Units (RSUs) are assumed to be the link between 20 vehicles and such trusted third party, or be the trusted third party itself.
Similarly to MANETs, VANETs can use existing cryptography-based solutions to overcome the different kinds of external attacks [1] . However, in addition to the cryptography cost in terms of overhead and processing time, these solutions cannot punish nor detect those attacks launched by an authorized vehicle 25 
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(inside attacker). For this reason, researchers have proposed novel trust management solutions inspired by economic science to deal with such unexpected inside attackers [2] . Unlike cryptography-based solutions, trust management has lower computational requirements and introduces a lower overhead, while also supporting mobility; however, it cannot detect outsider attackers. Hence, 30 trust modeling can be seen as an additional security technique that fills the gap of cryptography-based solutions. Moreover, trust is widely adopted as a replacement for cryptography, especially for delay-sensitive applications like VANET safety and real-time multimedia streaming applications.
Establishing trust in VANETs is based on the common assumption that trust 35 must be hard to obtain and easy to lose, which means that network entities must strive to increase the level of trust on themselves through their honesty and an adequate network collaboration, while such trust can be lost through a relatively lower number of dishonest acts [3] .
In this paper we focus mainly on the problem where vehicles can become 40 effective at achieving network disruption by alternating between legal behavior patterns and malicious attacks ("anti-trust management" strategies). Figure 1 illustrates this time-varying behaviour, which is similar to the On-Off attack in wireless sensors networks (WSN) [4] and known as betrayal attack in VANETs [5] . While trust management is generally based on an evaluation of historical 45 interactions, detecting these short-term attacks is a complex task. In addition, the bad mouthing attack [6] , which can be also seen as an anti-trust management strategy, occurs when no precautions are taken against selfish vehicles generating only bad reports about other vehicles.
Thus, we introduce an estimation of risk associated to behaviour changes as 50 an additional process to improve trust management among vehicles, thereby attempting to avoid sophisticated attacks. Our solution aims at filling-in the gap of classical trust models when facing the aforementioned illegal behavior. Trust and risk estimation processes rely on a timing-based technique to give more importance to actions occurring in recent time instants instead of accounting for ria, which are: (i) trust variability for different time intervals, i.e., the difference between consecutive trust evaluations; (ii) safety-related behavior referring to the reported event effectiveness, since this is a main concern for vehicular networks, while also representing the in-network collaboration of vehicles; and (iii) 60 evaluation of recommendations' quality, in order to avoid the bad mouthing attack.
Moreover, we use our trust establishment architecture to propose a novel multi-hop broadcasting technique that ensures high message delivery ratios even in the presence of vehicles acting as blackholes [7] without causing the broadcast 65 storm problem. The adversarial model addressed in this paper focuses mainly on the betrayal, blackhole, and bad mouthing attack techniques.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we present an adversarybased classification of the existing trust models for VANETs. Then, an overview of our proposal called RITA is provided in section 3. In section 4 we clarify the 70 trust and risk computation details. Afterward, in section 5, we explain how the trust establishment can enhance multi-hop broadcast message dissemination in VANETs. Section 6 is dedicated to the simulation parameters and results' discussion. Finally, section 7 provides some concluding remarks and the future directions for our work. 
Related works
Existing solutions are usually classified into entity-based [8, 9, 10] , databased [11, 12] , and hybrid trust models, depending on the revocation target, which can be dishonest entities, malicious messages, or both of them [13, 14, 15] . In addition, most VANET applications are based on multi-hop broadcast 80 vehicle-to-vehicle communication, and most of the existing trust models focus on routing, path disruption, and resource exhausting attacks including blackholes and bogus messages' injection. In the following, we survey and classify the main existing works depending on their adversary models.
Trust-based solutions against replayed, altered, and injected messages

85
This kind of attacks can cause huge damage, especially in safety-related contexts. Hence, most of the existing works fall under this category.
The entity-oriented trust models presented in [8, 9] try to revoke nodes by sending falsified messages and fake information, respectively, using different techniques. Haddadou et al. [8] chose to associate a credit value to each neigh-90 bor vehicle. This credit will increase or decrease depending on the concerned neighbor's messages trustiness. Concerning Yang's solution [9] , it uses the Euclidean distance to compute the similarity between nodes in terms of reported events. Unfortunately, the first solution does not differentiate between direct and indirect trust, while for the second it faces a huge problem in the case of 95 false recommendations.
The detection of attacks related to message quality is a process that is usually based on messages themselves, which explains why some of the existing works within this category are Data-oriented trust models [16, 12] .
Golle et al. [16] have adapted a signature-based technique in which every 100 received message is compared to a typical model of legal VANET messages.
The problem with this solution is that it is not feasible to actually build such global model; in addition, all new legal messages will be dropped as well. Unlike
[16], Gurung et al. [12] use three main metrics to classify received messages into 5 either legal or malicious messages; these metrics are content similarity, content 105 conflict, and routing path similarity. However, in addition to its high time complexity, this solution does not take into account the high level of mobility associated to VANETs, nor the case of node sparsity.
Some Hybrid trust models have been also proposed in this same context including [13, 17] . Zhang et al. [13] propose a semi-distributed trust framework 110 for message propagation and evaluation; in their approach the clusterheads are responsible for broadcasting and then gathering opinions about the broadcasted messages. Afterward, they decide either to drop untrustworthy messages or relay legal messages with the aggregated opinions to the next cluster in order to continue the dissemination process. Similarly to other cluster-based techniques,
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the clusterhead election and the probability of malicious nodes becoming clusterheads are the main problems of this solution.
Differently from the aforementioned works, Marmol et al. [17] prefer associating a confidence value to exchanged messages in addition to the gathered recommendations from both RSU and nearby vehicles to build three fuzzy sets 120 (no trust, +/-trust, trust). The message will be dropped if it belongs to the first set, accepted but not forwarded for the second set's case, and both accepted and forwarded for the trusted messages set. The number of recommendations and their trustworthiness remain as the pending problems of this solution.
Trust-based solutions against blackholes
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Inter-vehicular communication is the enabling process supporting ITS over VANETs. Hence, forcing nodes to be collaborative is an indispensable task.
Solutions falling under this category try to detect selfish nodes acting as blackholes in order to ensure a more efficient forwarding process for both safety and data messages.
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The Entity-oriented trust model proposed by Khan et al. [18] proposes computing a distrust level for every neighbor acting as a blackhole through a watchdog technique. This distrust level will be sent to the clusterhead, and in turn delivered to a third trusted party that revokes the attacker certificate. Unfor-tunately, authors did not detail the different communication steps involved, nor the overhead associated to the cluster-based implementation. Whereas, in our previous work called T ROU V E [19] , the idea was taking advantage of existing CAM messages, which are periodically exchanged according to the ETSI-ITS European standard [20] , in order to estimate the distribution of the selfish nodes within the network and, hence, select the most trusted path avoiding these 140 blackholes. However, this solution only addresses unicast data traffic in urban environments.
To deal with blackholes and the selective forwarding (greyholes) procedure, some Hybrid trust models are also available [15, 21] . The first solution, proposed by Sedjelmaci et al., is a two-level intrusion detection system, the first one being tation of a confidence value for each message coming from a unique source. In addition, for all messages describing a same event, a trust value is calculated using the previously computed confidence information. Finally, accepting or rejecting an event message depends on its trust value. Despite the high accuracy of this approach, it introduces a high waiting delay, which is not acceptable 185 when targeting VANET safety applications.
Unspecified adversarial model
In addition to the aforementioned trust models, in some works authors do not specify an adversarial model, nor the types of attack they support. Instead, they only address trust establishment over the inter-vehicular communication
The only Entity-oriented trust model falling under this category was proposed by Jesudoss et al. [24] . In particular, authors propose a clustering technique to reduce the communication overhead and assign a reputation weight to all nodes participating in the clusterhead election and network control tasks by sharing their reports about exchanged traffic. Unfortunately, this scheme does not respect reference trust metrics such as direct and indirect trust. Moreover, high mobility levels can cause this scheme's performance to decrease considerably.
Works in [14, 25, 26, 27] are examples of Hybrid trust approaches. 
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Under the assumption that all application messages are encrypted, Chen et al. [26] propose a beacon-based trust model for enhancing users' location privacy in VANETs. The proposed system can secure the VANET while maintaining privacy by using two kinds of messages: beacons and event-based messages.
The main idea is crosschecking the plausibility of these two types of messages adds a considerable overhead and processing delay. Moreover, authors do not provide information about its security performance.
State of the art review considerations
Through this hovering upon the existing solutions in the literature, it becomes clear that the adversarial models adopted assumes a consistent dishonest 240 behaviour throughout time. In addition, none of the existing works has studied the case of specific attacks against trust models themselves.
In addition, the assumption of many works about creating a global knowledge of the network [16, 11, 25, 14] can be effective in MANETs or similar environments that are less dynamic than VANETs. Moreover, relying on RSU 245 deployment for trust establishment [19, 15, 25] can also become a handicap since (i) they are not always present, and (ii) the trust relationship is mostly related to direct peer-to-peer interactions rather than peer-to-authority interactions.
Furthermore, many trust-based security solutions for VANETs [17, 8, 9, 23, 19] focus on improving the unicast and routing data exchange. However, critical
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VANET applications such as safety and service discovery are based on broadcast and multi-hop communication instead.
In this work, we propose a trust establishment technique for collaborative multi-hop communications called RITA. We enhance the trust computation by relying on risk estimation to deal with "anti-trust management" attacks. Hence, 255 our proposal can deal with both regular and intelligent attacks against classical trust-based solutions.
RITA Overview
The overall architecture of our proposal, called RIsk-aware Trust-based Architecture for collaborative multi-hop vehicular communications (RIT A), is il- In addition, a database that stores the different recommendations and trust variations is used to enhance trust and risk computation.
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The architecture of RITA takes advantage of the information carried by beacon, safety, and data messages to evaluate interactions among vehicles, which can be either direct or indirect interactions. Based on these interactions among nodes, the direct and indirect trusts are first computed and then combined to form an inter-vehicular trust evaluation (a). Simultaneously, the risk of a prob- Furthermore, it is clear that, for direct interactions, all messages (even those 280 initially encrypted) can be decrypted and analyzed by the end destination.
Hence, a decision about whether the interaction is legal (L) or malicious (M )
can be made using an interaction evaluation module.
Instead of updating trust values after each interaction, we propose defining node behaves legally for a long time and then starts an attack, the behaviour observed during the last slot t x weights more than the behaviour observed in previous slots, in addition to the trust variation during these previous slots.
The global trust evaluation denoted as GT , assigned by a vehicle i to another vehicle j, combines both inter-vehicular trust T rust(i, j) and the risk estimation Risk(i, j), as defined in equation 1.
In this equation α is a tuning factor used to adjust the trade-off between the inter-vehicles trust computation and the risk estimation when computing the global trust value. Notice that, since the risk estimation presents a greater error margin compared to trust estimations, it is better to choose α ≥ 0.5
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to give more weight to the latter parameter; the global trust evaluation will be anyway enhanced due to the introduction of the risk estimation factor. In section 6 we assign different values to the α parameter in order to choose the most adequate value for our experiments. However, it is worth mentioning that this value should be adapted to the different situations and traffic scenarios to 
DT (i, j) and IT (i, j) refer to the direct and indirect trust evaluation, respectively, calculated by a vehicle i concerning another vehicle j. The computation details of DT (i, j) and IT (i, j) are provided in the following sections. is computed following equation 3:
where L tx (i,j) and M tx (i,j) represent the number of legal and malicious interactions, respectively, between i and j from the perspective of node i.
represents the percentage of legal interactions compared to the total number of interactions, and 1 − shows how the direct trust is updated:
Factor β, whose value ranges between 0 and 1, is a reduction factor used to give more weight to the recent behavior of vehicles, while also taking into account their past behavior. In addition, this process is executed only for periods of time where there is at least one interaction between i and j; otherwise, the value of DT (i, j) will remain unchanged. 
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To avoid affecting the communications bandwidth, we propose modifying the format of the periodically exchanged beacon messages by adding only two fields:
(i) the neighbor identity, encoded in 1 byte, and (ii) the opinion of the beacon sender about that neighbor, also encoded in 1 byte. For example: if a node i considers that a vehicle j is untrusted, it will put the vehicle j's identity within 365 the next beacon along with an opinion which can be < 0.5 (untrusted node) or ≥ 0.5 (trusted node). This opinion correspond to the global trust evaluation of the recommender about the recommended node GT (i, j). This procedure is repeated until the entire neighbor list is included. Figure 3 illustrates the new beacon format. this threshold can be adapted depending on the security requirements and the traffic type.
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Similarly to direct trust, we assign a higher weight to the latest recommendations without forgetting the overall recommendations received. This is achieved through equation 6:
Notice that β is the same factor used in equation 4. It is clear that, if node i does not have any direct neighbor, or if it has only malicious neighbors, the 390 indirect trust (IT ) will remain unchanged.
Risk estimation
As mentioned in the related works section, trust establishment in highly dynamic networks suffers mainly from instant behavior changes since trust is based on the accumulative historical interactions. Thus, it is hard to quickly detect 
In this equation DT V (i,j) represents the maximum negative variation in direct trust given by a vehicle i to another vehicle j along different time slots, and 410 it is calculated as follows (equation 8):
A negative variation means that DT 
Finally, RC (i,j) is the evaluation of i about the recommendations (RC) that j has broadcasted within its beacons. If the number of negative recommendations is excessive (e.g., more than 50% of the generated recommendations), this event will be considered as an attempt to perform a bad mouthing attack. RC (i,j) will 425 be equal to the number of negative recommendations (< 0.5) divided by the total number of recommendations. Equation 11 summarizes the recommendations evaluation:
In addition, to improve the risk evaluation procedure, we associate to each 
Multi-hop information dissemination using RITA
Multi-hop dissemination is used mainly for alerting vehicles and authorities on the road about a safety event. However, multi-hop dissemination is also used for data message propagation.
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Using the global trust evaluation, any vehicle i can judge any neighbor j and, hence, accept or reject interactions with this neighbor. As mentioned above, a
Safety message
Next broadcaster 1 Byte Figure 4 : Safety message extension.
trust threshold can be chosen according to the system security requirements or context-based information; for instance, in safety cases this threshold should be low since it is a critical case. Thus, a decision about a vehicle 'j' can be made Since most VANET applications, such as Internet access, electronic payment, service discovery, and parking place booking, rely on Road Side Units (RSU) for communications [29] , the aim of multi-hop data message dissemination in these intelligent transportation systems services (ITS-s) is to reach the closest RSU 450 in a reduced period of time. Thus, we distinguish between two dissemination types: (i) safety messages dissemination, and (ii) data messages dissemination, in order to ensure a fast delivery of safety messages, and a high efficiency with low packet loss in infotainment scenarios.
Multi-hop dissemination of safety messages
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Same as beacons, we propose to extend safety messages with an additional field containing a pre-selected next broadcaster of the safety message, this way we avoid broadcast storms, as well as network resource exhaustion (see figure 4) .
The next broadcaster in every hop is selected in a way so that it is the farthest trusted neighbor, thereby maximizing the additional coverage area [30, 31] . For 460 every neighbor j the vehicle i associate a score Score(i, j) representing a balance between the global trust GT (i, j) and the distance Distance(i, j) between i and j as shown in equation 13
Equation 14 shows the selection procedure of a next broadcaster j among the neighbors of a vehicle i: (14) Where {k, ..., N} are the current neighbor identities for vehicle i.
Once the re-broadcasting is done, vehicles receiving the same safety message can again drop it and remove the saved version of this safety message as well.
Moreover, in the case of a broadcasting failure including both link-related and threat-related reasons, one of the informed vehicles should take the broadcasting 
In this equation DistanceT (i, j) refers to the distance-based waiting time,
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such as in [32, 33, 34] , and it is used in such a way that the farthest neighbor will have the shortest waiting time. T T , P T , and P RT correspond to the maximum Transmission, Propagation, and message PRocessing Times, respectively. checks the global trust GT (i, j). If it is lower than a predefined threshold, the safety message will be dropped because j is considered to be an untrusted vehicle. Otherwise, the broadcasting process should continue since 'j' is considered to be a trusted neighbor.
Afterward, if i finds its identity piggybacked within the safety message, this 490 means that it is the one selected as next-hop broadcaster. In addition, if the piggybacked identity is not even part of i's neighbors list, it verifies the safety event validity, selects the next broadcaster, and rebroadcasts the safety message. However, if the safety event's validity expires, the latter will be logically canceled. Otherwise, if i is not the selected vehicle for rebroadcasting the safety 495 message, and if its waiting time has expired without receiving another copy of the safety message, it selects a new next broadcaster to broadcast the safety message.
Algorithm 1 Safety messages multi-hop dissemination 1: Upon receiving a safety message by i sent by j;
if ('i' is the next broadcaster OR next broadcaster / ∈ neighbors list of 'i' ) then
4:
if NotExpired(safety message, relevance distance, validity duration) Broadcast(safety message, NextB);
else 8:
Cancel (safety message); if Expired(WaitingTime) AND NotReceived(safety message, NextB) Broadcast(safety message, NextB); 
Multi-hop dissemination of data messages
Disseminating data messages among vehicles is a procedure adopted by many
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VANET applications like delivering ads, restaurant menus, and short-term offers to passing-by vehicles. However, to have a sure and permanent broadcasting of this information, the use of road side units is mandatory. Hence, to preserve the communications bandwidth, vehicle-to-vehicle broadcasting is used only to reach the RSU.
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RITA assumes that vehicles are equipped with a Global Positioning System (GPS), so they can locate vehicles and RSUs within the network. Similarly to safety messages, we assume that we have an additional field containing the selected next forwarder identity as illustrated in figure 3 , but with data messages instead of safety messages.
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Unlike the safety messages (see equation 14) where the main concern is the delay, the next forwarder for data messages (NextF) is selected using the link duration estimation and distance in addition to the trust between peers in order to minimize both propagation delay and packet loss ratios. For every neighbor j the vehicle i associates a score Score(i, j) representing a balance between the trust 515 GT (i, j), the link duration LinkD(i, j), the distance Distance(i, j) separating i and j, and the distance separating j from the closest RSU Distance(j, RSU )
as shown in equation 16
Equation 17 represents the next forwarder selection based on the different neighbors' scores: (17) where {k, ..., N} is the set of neighbors for vehicle i. RSU is the closest roadside unit in the neighborhood which can be easily found using the GPS.
The sum of the global trust given by i to j, the distance between i and j, and the link duration between i and j, is divided by the distance between the neighbor j and the closest RSU, in order to get the closest, trusted and stable 525 path to the RSU, as shown in equation 17.
LinkD(i, k) is the link duration estimation between vehicle i and its neighbor k, and it is computed according to equation 18 .
In this equation R refers to the communication ratio, and V (i) is the speed of vehicle i. Algorithm 2 summarizes the data messages forwarding process.
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When a node i receives a data message forwarded by another node, it first checks whether it was selected as the next forwarder for that message. If so, it continues the forwarding process. Otherwise, the processing that follows depends on the application type, thus being outside the scope of this paper.
Afterward, if the data message sender had a higher trust than the predefined 535 threshold, the current node tries to reach the RSU if it is within communication range. Otherwise, it selects the next forwarder and then it forwards again the data message. Obviously, the message will be dropped if i considers j to be untrusted.
Algorithm 2 Data messages multi-hop dissemination.
1: Upon receiving a data message from j by i; if ∃ RSU ∈ neighbors of i then
5:
Forward(msg) to RSU; 
Performance evaluation
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To evaluate our RIT A architecture we relied on the NS-2 simulator [35] modified to consider the IEEE 802.11p standard. The generated vehicular traffic is based on the Citymob mobility model [36] , which uses SUMO [37] to create mobility traces based on real maps extracted from OpenStreetMap using the Krauss Mobility model [38] . In our case we used a map from the downtown 545 area of Laghouat, Algeria (see figure 6 ). Table 1 summarizes the main simulation parameters: 
We divide our experiments into three parts: first, we address the optimal selection of our time window and its time slots, as well as the trade-off between trust and risk information. Second, we compare the performance of our proposal 550 against two other existing proposals -T-CLAIDS [14] and the AECFV [15] -in different scenarios. While the AECFV proposal is dealing mainly with blackholes, the authors of T-CLAIDS did not detail their adversarial model, only assuming the attacker to have a stable continuous malicious behaviour. Finally, in the third part we discuss our proposed messages dissemination technique 555 effectiveness taking end-to-end delay and packet loss ratio as the target metrics.
In our scenario, we assume that beacons are exchanged every half a second, while an event (i.e. safety message) occurs every 10 seconds.
Determining the optimal parameter settings
In this section we will determine the optimal values for the α factor repre- we discuss the choices for the W and P which refers respectively to the window size and the slots duration parameters. Initially, we assume that factor α = 0.6, and that 25% of the vehicles within the network are dishonest and behave as 565 blackholes. Figure 7 represents the dishonest nodes detection ration with respect to the number of interactions (safety and data messages + the recommendations piggybacked to the received beacons), we note that the detection ratio increases until we reach approximately 100 interactions when it then offers almost a stable 570 values. Therefore, our solution can converge to its optimal detection ratios after approximately 100 interactions.
In addition, while varying the number of vehicles within the network, figure 8 shows that the average number of direct neighbors is also an important factor in the detection process, and that it is logically related to the amount of inter-575 vehicle interactions shown in figure 7 . Furthermore, figure 8 also shows that the average number of direct neighbors should not be below 2, otherwise, our proposal would not perform as good as expected.
As result, the size of W and P can be selected dynamically based of the num- For the experiments that follow, we pick the best settings, resulting in W = 100s and P = 20s. These values are achieved for a beacon frequency equal to 2 Hz (i.e, 2 beacons per second), and considering that a data message is sent by 590 every vehicle each 10s.
As discussed is section 4, factor α represents the trade-off between the intervehicular trust and the risk estimation, and so it can take different values to achieve different trade-offs. one.
RITA attackers detection performance
In this section we show RIT A's dishonest vehicles detection performances in the case of intelligent attackers that behave according to figure 1. Afterward, under a continuous dishonest behaviour, we compare our RIT A proposal against 615 two existing proposals: T-CLAIDS and AECFV. Figure 10 represents the detection ratios of RIT A with respect to the number of nodes. It shows that, when varying the number of vehicles in the network, our proposal can offer good detection ratios mostly exceeding the 90%. In fact, even for extremely high ratios of attackers (45%), the detection ratio remains 620 above 82%. The performance levels for more realistic attacker ratios (≤ 15%) are nearly 100%, despite all of them perform intelligent attacks thanks to the risk estimation that allows to RIT A detecting such behaviour.
In addition, we compared our solution against other proposals such as AECFV and T-CLAIDS. As discussed in sections 1 and 2, it should be noted that the latter are only able to detect blackhole attacks, being unable to deal with attackers endowed with trust establishment awareness, and able to launch intelligent attacks, which raises the detection complexity. Thus, we have simplified the adversarial model to blackhole attacks alone, meaning that attackers will merely send negative recommendations about its direct neighbors. Figure 11 repre-630 sents the detection ratios for different densities of vehicles. It shows that our proposal clearly outperforms T-CLAIDS and AECFV by more than 4% for a density higher that 300 vehicles. Here, since non of the risk estimation parameter have a high value exceeding the threshold T H discussed in the previous section, the α parameter is equal to 1. Hence, the risk estimation margin of 635 error is avoided. Figure 12 represents the detection ratios for different attacker ratios when the number of vehicles is set to 400. Similarly to figure 11, figure 12 shows that, when varying the ratio of dishonest vehicles in the scenario, RIT A is able to perform better than both AECFV and T-CLAIDS, ensuring high detection 640 ratios (>90%) even if almost half (45%) of the vehicles are dishonest. 
RITA messages delivery performance
We now study the effectiveness of the proposed dissemination technique in the presence of dishonest vehicles in the network. Since the message delivery process attempts to reach an RSU in the shortest possible time, we also assess 645 the impact of varying the RSUs density among: (a) 3 RSUs, (b) 6 RSUs, (c) 9
RSUs, and (d) 12 RSUs as illustrated in figure 13 . Figure 14 represents the average end-to-end delay required for packets to reach an RSU when varying the number of vehicles and RSUs in the network.
The resulting histogram shows that, except for the case of low vehicle and RSU 650 densities (less than 200 vehicles and less than 6 RSUs), our proposed technique is able to provide low delays to the message delivery process (≤ 1 second) despite the high attackers ratio (35%). For lower attacker ratios, results are even better.
Concerning the packet loss ratio, figure 15 shows that -similarly to the average end-to-end delay-and thanks to the best forwarder/broadcaster selection, cles higher than 200) and the presence of a significant number of RSUs (6 or more), and can reach quasi optimal values (less than 3%) for a dense network of both vehicles and RSUs (respectively more than 300 vehicle and 12 RSU). Simulation results have shown RIT A's ability to ensure high detection ratios exceeding the 90% even for a high presence ratios of attackers (45%), as well as short end-to-end delays (< 0.5s) and reduced packet loss ratios (< 3%) for a 675 scenario of more than 300 vehicles and 9 RSUs.
As future work, we plan to study some other types of adversaries adopting pseudonym-changing techniques for malicious purposes. We also plan to take advantage of the possible deployment of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to enhance the inter-vehicular trust accuracy. 
